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In this work, we present a generalized and robust facial
manipulation detection method based on color distribution
analysis of the vertical region of edge in a manipulated im-
age. Most of the contemporary facial manipulation method
involves pixel correction procedures for reducing awkward-
ness of pixel value differences along the facial boundary in
a synthesized image. For this procedure, there are distinc-
tive differences in the facial boundary between face manipu-
lated image and unforged natural image. Also, in the forged
image, there should be distinctive and unnatural features
in the gap distribution between facial boundary and back-
ground edge region because it tends to damage the natural
effect of lighting. We design the neural network for detect-
ing face-manipulated image with these distinctive features
in facial boundary and background edge. Our extensive ex-
periments show that our method outperforms other existing
face manipulation detection methods on detecting synthe-
sized face image in various datasets regardless of whether
it has participated in training.
1. Introduction
With rapid development of AI-based generative model
[16, 29, 11], facial manipulation methods also improved in
terms of generating realistic fake face image and changing
one’s face identity to others. As face synthesizing algo-
rithms become more and more sophisticated, abuse cases
and social issues derived from forged image have recently
emerged. These realistically synthesized video for mali-
cious purpose already becomes threat in terms of truth issue
of public media, individual privacy [37], e.g., politician’s
fake news, celebrity pornography. For these reasons, de-
tecting facial manipulated image effectively is crucial and
important issue in computer vision field.
Existing works suggested their method with only fo-
cusing features that appear on the synthesized face image
in datasets which generated by specific manipulation algo-
Figure 1. Summarized steps of face manipulation procedure. Gen-
erated image is created from source face image and generative
model. For pasting generated image to target image realistically,
post-processing is involved after image manipulation
rithms [23, 2, 38] or focusing on designing artificial neural
network architectures [25, 1, 31] with referring whole im-
age rather than paying attention to face manipulation proce-
dure. Their own methods work well with specific datasets
which they analyzed prior to design detection methods
while they do not work well when it comes to classify syn-
thesized video without prior information. Focusing on spe-
cific manipulation algorithms or referring whole image fea-
tures is inefficient method when it comes to real-world sce-
nario where we determine the authenticity of an arbitrary
image without any prior information about the source data
and manipulation procedures.
Most of face synthesizing algorithms nowadays com-
monly involve face boundary post-processing after face al-
tering from one image to other image to reduce awkward-
ness of pixel distribution difference between original image
and altered face image [19], as shown in Figure 1. Recent
studies [18, 19, 33] pay attention to these shared procedures
of face manipulation algorithms for detecting the synthe-
sized image considering its generalization ability with other
various datasets. Involved post-process procedure with face























unique fingerprint in one image and makes the pixel dis-
tribution difference along face boundary area between post-
processed manipulated image and unforged natural image.
Our work pays attention to extracting pixel value dif-
ference features along boundary area for detecting face
manipulated image. With referring existing edge detec-
tor algorithms [27, 3], we gather set of vertical line of fa-
cial boundary and compute corresponding pixel difference
along vertical lines. If a facial image is altered and gets
post-processing procedure to smooth the facial boundary,
there will be little difference in pixel values nearby face
while unforged natural image has relatively large difference
in pixel values nearby face because the pixel on the facial
boundary were not modified.
Additionally, we gather boundary pixel differences along
perpendicular line of background boundary. To analyze the
difference with the feature extracted from the face bound-
ary, the pixel difference values in the direction vertical to
the background boundary are obtained in a similar method
to facial feature extraction procedure. The difference be-
tween the features of the extracted background boundary
and the features of the face boundary will be significantly
different between the unforged natural image and the face
manipulated image.
For classifying gathered features with outstanding per-
formance, we use one-dimensional convolutional neural
network which is used for extracting distinctive features
in sequential data [12] because the gathered features are
computed as pixel difference data which are ordered ac-
cording to perpendicular direction of boundary of face and
background. Rather than developing a complex and heavy
classification model, we developed our own model that is
lightweight and can classify with very good performance
through the features we have extracted. We show our
method with suggested classification model outperforms
other existing manipulation detection in terms of model
training stability and universality to other various datasets.
The contribution of this paper to the field of face manipu-
lation detection is its outstanding performance and general-
ization regardless of dataset and generation algorithms. Our
proposed method uses the pixel difference values as features
and additionally uses information about the background of
the image, so it does not bias toward specific source data or
specific generation algorithms and performs with remark-
ably high detection accuracy regardless of face manipula-
tion datasets.
2. Related Work
In this section, we will briefly introduce several previous
image manipulation detection technologies from early stud-
ies of image forgery detection to the latest works which are
related to our proposed method.
AI-generated image classification. In the beginning of re-
search about detecting AI-generated image, existing studies
[39, 22, 24, 17] show that there is a difference in color dis-
tribution between the real image and entirely-created fake
image made by AI-based generative model. There is a lim-
itation of generative model that the image totally created
leaves their own artificial imprints. AI-based generative
model cannot perfectly reproduce original fingerprints of
authentic natural image which made by intrinsic properties
of hardware such as surface of camera lens and the direc-
tion of the light entering the camera. However, the problem
of detecting manipulated images in which only the face re-
gion is altered must be approached slightly differently from
the studies of determining authenticity of entirely generated
images.
AI-Based Face Manipulation Detection. With rapidly
progressed generative models and synthesizing techniques,
there have been a lot of malicious usage such as realistically
synthesizing one’s face to other’s body. For arising threats
of these image forgery in terms of privacy and trust issues,
there have been many studies [8, 21, 28] to detect face ma-
nipulated images. For instance, Matern et al. [23] present
detection method based on visual artifacts, especially eyes
and noses. Yang et al. [38] suggested a method of detect-
ing face manipulation images through the inconsistency of
the head pose. While these works pay attention to figure
out some awkwardness features of synthesized image, re-
cent works [25, 1, 31, 40], focus on detecting with well-
designed state-of-the-arts artificial neural networks, such as
recurrent neural network and capsule network.
All of these proposed works mainly focused on features
appearing in synthesized image or designing the model ar-
chitecture with synthesized image itself in specific datasets.
Their works demonstrated only specific algorithms with
limited source datasets while verifying with extensive ex-
periment including real-world scenario for detecting unseen
data with no prior information has failed.
Generalized Face Manipulation Detection. As the need
for a methodology that can be better applied to real situa-
tions is increasing, the latest studies [4, 8] begin to focus on
the characteristics that appear in the face image synthesis
process rather than to the synthesized image result. Espe-
cially, Li et al. [19] pay attention to common procedure
of face manipulation which include post-processing with
boundary smoothing. Face X-ray [18], which is most re-
cent work of generalized detection method focus on com-
mon blending procedure in various face manipulation al-
gorithms and shows their generalization ability with un-
seen datasets for real-world scenario. Their work perform
well with FaceForensics++ dataset which has several sub-
datasets of different manipulation types with sharing source
data, while experiences performance drop with totally dif-
ferent datasets. Our study further derive higher performance
with more generality by extracting not only facial features,
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Figure 2. Brief illustration of edge window. Each point is spaced
equally above the line segments. Center point in window implies
mid-point Mi,i+1 of 2 neighboring landmark points, Li and Li+1
but also extracting innate fingerprints of background edges
and comparing them with facial features.
3. Methods
In this section, we will explain the motivation of our
methods, brief reason of gathering boundary pixel features,
and detailed process of boundary feature extraction.
Motivation from Edge Detector Algorithm. We focus
on existing edge detector algorithms for defining boundary.
The edge detected by edge detector is the boundary point
where the change of intensity is large based on the gray-
scaled image [14]. Canny edge detector [3] which is the
most used edge detector nowadays preferentially compute
1st order derivatives in the X and Y directions in given im-
age by convolution with Sobel mask [32] before detecting
edges in image. The gradient G in which the pixel value
changes rapidly can be obtained with gathered 1st derivate
values in X and Y directions. Gradient G implies the per-
pendicular direction of the boundary appearing in the im-
age. We focused on the process of edge detector finding the
boundary in an image through gradient. Since the distribu-
tion of pixel values of the face part in the image and the dis-
tribution of pixel values of the non-face parts are different,
the pixel value will sharply change in a direction perpendic-
ular to the boundary of the face.
Artificial Imprints Harming Natural Fingerprints. Early
research in image forensic [10] mention that unforged nat-
ural image has a unique fingerprint generated in the pro-
cedure of image processing and hardware characteristics
such as camera lens. However, recent studies [39, 22] show
that forged images created by the generative models such
as GAN has unique imprints from synthesizing procedure.
Regardless of generative model types, the face replacing
process and the post-processing process to reduce the dif-
ference in pixel values between the source image and the
target image damage the natural image fingerprints across
the facial boundary. For this reason, it is obvious that there
is a difference between the synthesized facial boundary and
the unforged natural image in terms of pixel values distribu-
tion. In addition, we emphasize the difference between the
unmanipulated image and the forged image by contrasting
the difference between the original fingerprint appearing on
the background which is not involved in the facial synthesis
process and the fingerprint on the face. Taking all of these
into account, we can detect face manipulated image based
on information of entire image and facial area in terms of
boundary pixel feature.
Two-way feature extraction. We suggest two-way fea-
ture extraction method for detailed information in terms of
two aspects, shared post-process procedure of face manip-
ulation technology and boundary characteristics in whole
image. One is facial boundary feature extraction which
reflects pixel-level distributions by post-process procedure
while the other is background boundary feature extraction
which contains pixel-level distribution along boundary in
unforged region of image.
3.1. Facial Boundary Feature Extraction
With a frame image I extracted from the video, we detect
face area in image with frontal face detector in dilb [13]. It
is assumed that only single face is appeared in the video.
Then we extract 68 feature points of the detected face with
68 face landmark shape predictor in dlib. Among those de-
tected landmarks, 17 points representing the outer boundary
of the face are selected. These chosen landmark points are
used to define the facial boundary in image. The line seg-
ment Pi,i+1 perpendicular to the facial boundary line is de-
fined by vertical direction and midpoint of two neighboring
landmark points Li and Li+1 in facial boundary points.
Note that perpendicular line segment Pi,i+1 is paramet-
ric equation with parameter t which consists of 20 inte-
ger parameter with range -10 to 9, from inside of face to
outside of face. There are 16 perpendicular line segments
which made from 17 face landmark points representing fa-
cial boundary. Each Pi,i+1 have 20 corresponding coordi-
nate information along vertical direction of boundary line at
equal intervals.
To better reflect the perpendicular line segment in a spe-
cific area of the face, we tuned line segment size with scale-
factor, which is inversely proportional to the facial area. By
tuning with the scale-factor, the perpendicular line segment
Pi,i+1 pass through a certain range of the facial boundary
regardless of face size in image.
For making window-shaped coordinate features, set of
horizontal line segments Vi,i+1 which are parallel to fa-
cial boundary line and go through the t-th point of gathered
line segment Pi,i+1 is generated. Horizontal line segments
are also represented by parametric equation with parame-
ter u which has 20 integer parameters with range -10 to
9. Window-shaped 20×20 corresponding coordinates are
specified by set of 20 horizontal lines. Figure 2 illustrates
example of extracted edge window. We will call these 400
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Figure 3. Facial boundary window generation pipeline. (a) Capture image I from video. (b) Get a facial boundary line with face landmark
points detected from (a). (c) Make perpendicular line segment Pi,i+1 with neighboring landmark points. (d) Create set of horizontal lines
Vi,i+1 perpendicular to line segment Pi,i+1 at equal intervals.
coordinate features to edge window Wi, which is set of hor-
izontal lines Vi,i+1 with two parameter t and u. A total
of 16 windows are created per face image with 17 facial
boundary landmarks. Summarized pipeline of generating
windows from one facial image is shown in Figure 3.
To find out how the corresponding RGB pixel values in
edge window Wi change from the inside to the outside of
the face, we compute the absolute difference of RGB pixel
values according to the parameter t. Then we average pixel
difference values in 20 horizontal lines for statistical differ-
ence in boundary region. These extracted 16×19×3 color
difference features are facial boundary features, 16 refers
the number of edge windows W in one facial image, 19
indicates the differentiated feature along parameter t and 3
stands for RGB.
3.2. Background Boundary Feature Extraction
Prior to extracting the features of background edge
points, we make a background edge image EI from frame
image I . For removing noise of background and extract
prominent boundary parts, we blur the image I with Gaus-
sian filter. Then rough edge image E
′
I including edge points
on face is generated with Canny edge detector.
Facial edge points in E
′
I must be excluded for extract na-
ture fingerprint of background edges. For removing facial
edge points, we considered convex image CI that covers
face contour. CI is binary image that has same size of orig-
inal image I with inner points of convex are 0 and outer
points of convex are 1. We would like to ensure that the
edges appearing on the face were excluded. Big-face con-
vex image C
′
I is created by blurring CI with Gaussian Filter
and round down each value in blurred CI to 0 except the





I , we can get edge image EI which excludes fa-
cial edge points. Brief pipeline of making edge image EI is
Figure 4. Background edge image generation procedure
shown at Figure 4.
For making background boundary feature from edge
points in background edge image EI , we randomly sam-
pled 10% points of total edge points in EI to get statistical
information which appears along background edges. Using
sampled edge points, background windows are extracted in
a same way of facial boundary feature extraction, with Li
and Li+1 correspond to two nearest points of one sampled
point. Summarized background edge windows generating
procedure is shown at 5.
While edge windows in facial boundary have specified
direction, from inside of face to outside of face with per-
pendicular direction, the direction of parameter t in back-
ground edge windows from background edge image can-
not be specified except that they have vertical direction of
boundary lines. For this reason, we fold the background
boundary feature and unfold symmetrically with the basis
on T = 10 for removing directional information in edge
window, e.g., all feature values in T = 1 and T = 19 are av-
eraged by axis and modified to averaged values. Final shape
of mirrored background boundary color difference features
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Figure 5. Background boundary feature extraction pipeline. (a) Capture image I from video. (b) Make a background edge image without
facial boundary EI . (c) Sample edge points in Edge Image from edge image EI . (d) Make vertical lines and horizontal lines in the same
way as the facial line segments were extracted.
has shape of N×19×3. Note that N is the number of sam-
pled edge points in background edge image EF while 19
and 3 are same as mentioned in Section 3.1.
4. Analysis with Extracted Features
In this section, we briefly analyze how the features ex-
tracted from the image appear according to the authenticity
of image prior to experimenting.
Datasets. We would like to analyze with various up-
to-date face manipulation datasets with diverse generation
algorithms for demonstrating our method’s generalization
ability. We adopt several datasets: FaceForensics++ [30],
Celeb-DF [20], DFD [6] and DFDC [7]. All of these
datasets contains genuine video data and face manipulated
video data from genuine ones with reduced awkwardness of
pixel values. We randomly choose 750 genuine videos and
750 manipulated videos for FaceForensics++, DFD, and
DFDC each. Exceptionally, since Celeb-DF dataset has less
than 750 genuine video data, we choose 563 genuine video
data and 750 manipulated video data in Celeb-DF dataset.
We plotted a graph to statistically analyze the change ac-
cording to the parameter t value of the color features ob-
tained by our method. Figure 6 shows difference value dis-
tributions along parameter t-direction from pre-processed
facial features and background features in three datasets,
Celeb-DF, FaceForesics++ and DFDC. Note that boundary
edge points are at t = 9. We observe that there is a distri-
bution difference between the facial features derived from
the face manipulated image and the facial features extracted
from the real image. There is significant difference in distri-
bution points close to t = 9 point, which indicates the point
along facial boundary line. Since a generated face image
may have unusual pixel distribution in face boundary re-
gion because of post-processing methods to correct the dif-
ference in color values along the synthesized parts, the dif-
ference in color distribution is inevitable.
Also, the distribution seen in these three datasets have
in common that the difference between facial features and
background features is relatively larger for the unforged im-
age than for the face manipulated image. This observation
shows that reflecting the facial information and background
information together could help solve the problem of gen-
erality.
5. Experiment
In this section, we introduce our experiment setups, im-
plementation details and result of extensive experiment with
aspect of overall performance, universality and comparison
with other contemporary works to verify our methods.
For conclusive evaluation of detection performance, we
mainly trained with Celeb-DF dataset, which is difficult for
other papers to derive remarkable detection performance
[36] and use FaceForensics++, DFD, DFDC datasets ad-
ditionally. When testing, we cross-validate through all of
these datasets to demonstrate universality of our method.
Additional preprocessing for experiment. We would like
to get information of difference between the distribution in-
dicated by the difference in color values at the edge region
with aspect of face and background. We get difference value
with following Equ. (1)
DI,n = FI,n − B̂I (1)
Note that FI,n, B̂I and DI,n indicate facial boundary fea-
ture in nth window, averaged background boundary feature,
and difference between FI,n and B̂I each. Final features
derived from background edge region is DI,n with a shape
of 16×19×3. Then we flatten the facial feature which ex-
tracted in Section 3.1 from shape 16×19×3 to 304 linear
feature with 3 RGB channels. Also, the background fea-
tures which extracted from Section 3.2 are flattened in the
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Figure 6. Color difference distribution of extracted features from 3 different datasets.
same way. The input shape of the preprocessed features for
the classification model has a 6-channel 304 linear feature
consisting of 3 channels of flatten face features and 3 chan-
nels of flatten background features.
Classification Model. To further highlight distinctive fea-
tures between unforged image and face manipulated im-
age, we adopt 1-dimensional convolutional neural networks
(1D-CNN) which is widely used in the field of natural lan-
guage processing for extracting features from sequential in-
puts [12] unlike other existing manipulation detection mod-
els [30, 7] using 2-dimensional convolutional neural net-
works (2D-CNN) to process image features, since the ex-
tracted color difference features are sequential data accord-
ing to the parameter t. While advanced face manipulated
image classification models are mainly designed to be com-
plex and heavy for extracting significant information from
whole images, we constructed a lightweight simple model
to process our pre-processed distinctive color features. The
number of total epoch is set to 1000 and the batch size is set
to 20. The learning rate is set as 0.00075 using Adam [15]
optimizer. Additionally we scheduled optimizer to multiply
0.5 to learning rate at every 200 epochs for decaying learn-
Performance (AUC)
Study FF++ / DFD DFDC Celeb-DF
Matern et al. [23] 78.0 66.2 55.1
Yang et al. [38] 47.3 55.9 54.6
Li et al. [19] 93.0 75.5 64.6
Zhou et al. [40] 70.1 61.4 53.8
Nguyen et al. [25] 96.6 53.3 57.5
Ours 99.8 97.9 95.2
Table 1. Performance result compared with recent works
ing rate. Cross-entropy function is used for loss function.
5.1. Detection Performance with Specific Dataset
We firstly experiment with one specific dataset for both
training and testing. To evaluate our experiment results,
several existing methods results [23, 38, 19, 40, 25] which
are validated with all of four state-of-the-arts datasets (Face-
Forensics++, DFD, DFDC and Celeb-DF) cited from their
original paper are shown with our results. Summarized per-




Study Training set FF++ DFD DFDC Celeb-DF
Xception [30] FF++ - 87.8 54.3 40.9
Face X-ray [18] FF++ and BI 98.52 95.4 80.92 80.58
Ours FF++ 99.8 95.1 89.5 87.7
Table 2. Generalization ability comparison with Xception Network, Face X-ray and ours with several datasets. BI indicates generated
additional dataset made by FaceForensics++ datasets with applying method of Face X-ray [18]
Cross-Validation Performance (AUC)
Test set
Training set FF++ DFD DFDC Celeb-DF
FF++ 99.8 95.1 89.5 87.7
DFD 95.9 99.8 88.5 87.6
DFDC 98.5 93.0 97.9 88.3
Celeb-DF 99.8 99.5 97.1 95.2
Table 3. Cross-validation Performance result
Performance (AUC)
Study FF++/DF Celeb-DF
FWA [19] 79.2 53.8
Face X-ray [18] 99.2 74.8
Ours 99.8 95.2




Du et al. [8] 90.9 63.2
Nguyen et. al [26] 92.8 54.1
Riess et al. [4] 94.5 72.6
Ours 99.8 95.5
Table 5. Performance comparison with 3 other recent works train-
ing with Face2Face dataset.
tion methods in terms of AUC, which is area under the Re-
ceiver Operating Characteristic curve is in Table 1. We
observe that our performance results outperform those of
the other papers mentioned, especially in terms of verify-
ing with Celeb-DF dataset (95.2%) which makes other ad-
vanced manipulation detection methods performance dras-
tically dropped.
5.2. Cross-Validation with Various Datasets
We design cross-validation experiment for testing our
approach with aspect of robustness to real-world scenar-
ios. In this experiment, we train our model with one
dataset and test with the other dataset for making scenar-
ios that detect manipulated image with unseen dataset. Ta-
ble 3 shows cross-validation performance result of our ap-
proach in terms of AUC. We observed that cross-validating
with Celeb-DF features trained model can obtain more gen-
eralized results compared with trained model with other
datasets. These inconsistency by training sets may be oc-
cured because the extracted feature from Celeb-DF dataset
have relatively less distinctive difference between unforged
image and manipulated image compared with other three
datasets. We can see that a model trained with a dataset with
a relatively less prominence features such as Celeb-DF per-
forms well when verifying a dataset with more prominent
features. Nevertheless, any experiment results with DFDC
and Celeb-DF as test dataset outperforms any other referred
face manipulation detection methods.
5.3. Comparison with Latest Works
For more precise evaluation with aspect of universality,
we compared our performance result with latest works [30,
19, 18, 4, 8, 26] in terms of generalization ability. Table
4 shows the comparison of best performance with ours and
Face X-ray [18] in terms of training with one sub-dataset in
FaceForensics++ [30] and testing with other dataset. There
are 4 sub-datasets in FaceForensics++ datasets, including
DeepFake [5], Face2Face [35], FaceSwap [9], NeuralTex-
tures [34]. We cite two compared results directly in [18],
XceptionNet results from [30] and Face X-ray results. Ta-
ble 2 summarizes AUC results compared with these existing
contemporary works and ours. Although we cannot repro-
duce exactly same BI datasets which additionally generated
from FaceForensics++ datasets with mentioned method in
[18], we can see the our framework outperform other two
approaches with aspects of best performance of AUC.
We also present the AUC of verifying with one dataset
compared with Face Warping Artifacts [19] and Face X-ray
[18] in Table 4. Our approach shows better results in both
detection performance with specific dataset, and universal-
ity for various face synthesizing algorithms universality.
Lastly, we compare with other 3 recent works which sug-
gest other approaches for universality. Each studies focus
on learning innate representation in manipulated image [4,
8] and do detection and localization of synthesized feature
simultaneously [26]. Table 5 shows the generalization abil-
ity results compared with referred 3 works [4, 8, 26]. We
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observe that our approach can show better performance in
terms of universality for different type of synthesizing algo-
rithm. compared with other studies which don’t approach
with aspect of common manipulation procedure of synthe-
sizing algorithms.
6. Conclusion
We present a face manipulation detection methods with
leveraging facial boundary features which corresponding
to color features modified by common boundary post-
processing of generation procedures. In addition to refer-
ring facial features, background features corresponding to
unchanged characteristics containing image’s innate finger-
prints are used for detecting face synthesized image. We
reveal the importance of utilizing both facial edge infor-
mation and background edge information with outstanding
detection performance better than other existing advanced
face manipulation detection methods. Cross-validating with
state-of-the-arts datasets demonstrate our approach not only
remarkably performed with specific dataset but can also be
fully applied in real-world situations.
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